The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Article III Analysis for A New Breed of Judicial Officer by Shannon, Brendan Linehan
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 1 Article 12
The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Article III
Analysis for A New Breed of Judicial Officer
Brendan Linehan Shannon
Copyright c 1991 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Brendan Linehan Shannon, The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Article III Analysis for A New Breed of
Judicial Officer, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 253 (1991), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol33/
iss1/12
NOTES
THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT: A NEW ARTICLE III
ANALYSIS FOR A NEW BREED OF JUDICIAL OFFICER
"If [the Federal Magistrates Act] assigns judges' work to
magistrates, who do not have the tenure and compensation
guarantees in Article HI, it violates Article HIU"
"Given the bloated dockets that district courts have now
come to expect as ordinary, the role of the magistrate in
today's federal judicial system is nothing less than indispen-
sable."2
Congress and federal judges have steadily expanded the role
of magistrates in the federal judicial system since the passage
of the Federal Magistrates Act3 in 1968. Under the original terms
of the Act, magistrates had few enumerated powers, and final
decisionmaking authority remained at all times with a federal
judge.4 In the two decades since Congress passed the Act, con-
gressional amendment of the law and expansive judicial inter-
pretation have resulted in a new breed of judicial officer. In
effect, magistrates now exercise many of the same powers as
federal district judges; they decide motions, hear evidence, in-
struct juries, and render final decisions in civil and criminal
cases.
The expanding role of magistrates in the federal judicial system
raises serious constitutional questions. Although magistrates per-
form many of the same functions as Article III judges, they are
not afforded the same constitutional protections as judges.5 Mag-
1. Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1046 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner,
J., dissenting).
2. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211 (1990).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (current version at 28 U.S.C. SS 631-639
(1988)).
4. Congress suggested three discrete areas in which magistrates could serve: "(1)...
as a special master . . .; (2) [providing] assistance to a district judge in the conduct of
pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and (3) [conducting] prelim-
inary review of applications for posttrial relief .... " Id. at 1113.
5. For the purposes of this Note, the term "judge" refers to a district judge, appeals
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istrates do not enjoy lifetime tenure, rather they serve eight-
year terms, 6 and Congress may reduce their salaries simply by
amending the Act.7 Moreover, magistrates are appointed by judges
in the district in which the magistrate will serve, and not by the
President or Congress.8
The expanded authority of magistrates violates traditional
Article III analysis: neither the adjunct officer doctrine nor the
legislative court doctrine9 supports this broad expansion of au-
thority. The Supreme Court's interpretation of Article III has
developed in the context of the separation of powers scheme,
wherein Article III's guarantees of tenure and salary operate
both to insulate the judiciary from executive and legislative
coercion and to ensure that the judicial branch remains a vital
force in the system of checks and balances. 10
Felony voir dire provides a specific context that may prove
illustrative of the Act's overall constitutional defects.1' Voir dire
merits close attention because it has recently been the subject
of considerable controversy, 12 and because it implicates both a
party's ability to waive its right to an Article III judge and the
limits of a magistrate's jurisdiction within Article Ill and the
Act. Other functions that magistrates perform, such as controlling
civil jury trials from beginning to final order"3 and having juris-
court judge, or Supreme Court Justice appointed by the President of the United States
and protected by the guarantees of tenure and salary in Article I. The term "magistrate"
refers to a United States magistrate judge, the new title of officeholders under the
Federal Magistrates Act. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (current version at 28
U.S.C. S 631-639 (1988)).
6. 28 U.S.C. S 631(e).
7. Id. S 634(b) (providing that "the salary of a full-time United States magistrate shall
not be reduced, during the term in which he is serving, below the salary fixed for him
at the beginning of that term"). No constitutional provision, however, prevents Congress
from amending the terms of the Act to effect a change in the magistrates' compensation
structure.
8. Id. S 631(a) (providing for the appointment of magistrates: "[tihe judges of each
United States district court . . . shall appoint United States magistrates in such numbers
and to serve at such locations within the judicial district as the [Judicial Conference of
the United States] may determine under this chapter"). See infra notes 205-12 and
accompanying text.
9. These doctrines constitute exceptions to Article III, recognized by the Supreme
Court, which allow officers without guarantees of tenure and salary to exercise the
judicial power of the United States. See infra notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
11. Empanelment of juries by magistrates was a common practice in many jurisdictions
throughout much of the 1980's. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1542, 1545
n.2 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that in 1989, 51 of the 93 federal judicial districts had local
rules that unqualifiedly authorized district courts to delegate jury selection to magistrates
in criminal cases"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2886 (1991).
12. See infra notes 81-150 and accompanying text.
13. Congress explicitly granted this power to magistrates by statute: "Upon the consent
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diction over misdemeanors, 14 raise potentially the same Article
III concerns as those of voir dire.
The Federal Magistrates Act has been the subject of frequent
amendment by Congress, and with each amendment, Congress
has expanded the authority of federal magistrates. 5 Although
the Act contains a short list of tasks that a district court may
not assign to a magistrate, such as summary judgment motions
and motions to dismiss, 6 no guarantee exists that Congress will
not attempt in the future to confer upon magistrates the authority
to preside over such proceedings. Moreover, the increase in the
federal criminal docket has spurred interest in vesting magis-
trates with the authority to try certain types of felony cases.
For example, a section of the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1990 would
have given magistrates the power to preside over felony trials
arising out of the savings and loan scandal. 7 Although the Senate
rejected the proposal, the proposal indicates the increasing in-
terest in employing federal magistrates to relieve pressures on
the federal judicial system.
This Note addresses in two stages the problems created by
the delegation of duties to magistrates. First, the Court's tradi-
tional tools for Article III analysis do not provide a sufficient
doctrinal basis for examining an active magistracy. Second, in
light of the recognized competence of the corps of magistrates
and their close relationship with Article III courts, a more flexible
approach to Article III analysis is necessary.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address magistrate
jurisdiction in the October Term of 1990. The Court granted
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate... may conduct any or all proceedings
in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case... 28
U.S.C. S 636(cXl) (1988).
14. See 18 U.S.C. S 3401(a), (b) (1988) (granting magistrates jurisdiction over misde-
meanors upon receipt of the written consent of the defendant). Writing in dissent, Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, suggested that a defendant's silence
could not satisfy the consent requirement, and that an oral agreement to the participation
might also be insufficient. Under this approach, the standard for evaluating the effect-
iveness of consent in voir dire arises out of the written consent requirements for referral
of misdemeanor trials. See Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2675 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
15. See infra notes 21-38 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the Federal
Magistrates Act).
16. 28 U.S.C. S 636(bX1)A) provides that a judge may not refer the following tasks to
a magistrate:
[A] motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary
judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the
defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit
maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.
17. S. 1970, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. S 4301 (1990).
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certiorari in United States v. France8 to review a panel decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that
reversed a felony conviction on the ground that empanelment of
a jury by a magistrate constituted reversible error. The Court
merely affirmed the panel decision in a one sentence per curiam
opinion indicating that the Court was equally divided. 9 On the
same day the Court decided France, it granted the defendant's
petition for certiorari in United States v. Peretz.20 Peretz presented
a procedural situation nearly identical to France, except that in
Peretz, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
defendant's conviction on the ground that empanelment of a jury
by a magistrate is proper when the defendant has failed to object.
In a five-to-four ruling, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the defendant's conviction in Peretz. The Court's holding
was narrow and provides little guidance either to Congress or
to lower courts in determining the limits of a magistrate's au-
thority in other contexts that are likely to arise. Despite the
Court's holding in Peretz, the traditional approach to Article III
is too constrictive when applied to the special circumstances of
federal magistrates. Based upon the foregoing premise, this Note
offers an alternative approach to Article III. The proposed anal-
ysis is tailored to the unique situation of the magistrates and
balances the benefit to the judicial system and litigants derived
from referral to magistrates against the threat to core Article
III values. The complexity of the task, the efficacy of appellate
review, and the possibility of obtaining the uncoerced consent of
the parties all weigh heavily in the analysis.
THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT
IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE III
Legislative History of the Act
Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act 2' in response to
two major problems then facing the federal judiciary. First, the
18. 886 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1921 (1990), affld per curiam,
111 S. Ct. 805 (1991).
19. The Court heard oral arguments for France on October 2, 1990, several weeks prior
to Justice Souter's confirmation.
20. 904 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 781, affd, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991).
21. 28 U.S.C. S§ 631-639 (1988).
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Act proposed a corps of magistrates to replace the obsolete and
ineffective system of United States Commissioners. Second, in
recognition of the difficulties a rapidly growing caseload pre-
sented,23 Congress intended that the magistrates would relieve
district judges of certain ministerial or subordinate duties, freeing
them for more productive case management and trial work.24
The Act created positions for a highly qualified and motivated
corps of public servants to assist district judges in a broad range
of tasks. Congress listed in the Act a number of tasks that
magistrates could perform,s but the legislative history accom-
panying the Act clearly indicates that Congress did not intend
the terms of the Act to establish an exhaustive list. Rather,
Congress intended the statutory grants of authority to serve as
a guide and for district judges to experiment freely in delegating
tasks to magistrates.2
22. See Edward Weisfelner, Note, United States v. Raddatz: Judicial Economy at the
Expense of Constitutima Guarantees, 47 BRQOK. L. REv. 559, 560-61 n.7 (1981). Congress
created the United States commissioner system after the Civil War, and it remained
nearly unchanged for a century thereafter. Commissioners were not required to be
attorneys. They exercised civil jurisdiction limited primarily to administrative tasks and
were compensated according to an antiquated per-case system.
In the legislative history accompanying the 1968 Act, Congress noted specifically that
the commissioners were of little help to federal district judges due to their extremely
limited jurisdiction and to the judges' well-grounded reservations regarding the compe-
tency of the commissioners. H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968), reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4252-57. The House Report accompanying the 1968 Act listed
some of the "substantial defects" of the commissioner system: the fee system compensated
commissioners on the basis of the number and nature of proceedings they handled and
occasionally put the commissioner in the position of having a pecuniary interest in the
matter before him; the low statutory income ceiling ($10,500 in 1968) discouraged quality
candidates from applying; commissioners were required to meet office expenses out of
their own resources so that most offices were "understaffed and poorly accommodated";
and despite the fact that many of the commissioners were nonlawyers, they were often
called upon to interpret and apply sophisticated legal principles, a task well beyond their
competence. Id. at 4255-57.
23. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES CouRTs 6 (1987) (stating that the number of cases filed in federal district courts
more than tripled from 1960 to 1986); see also Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Praetical Innovative
and Progressive Utilization of United States Magistrates to Improve the Administration of
Justice in the United States District Courts, 28 How. L.J. 293, 298-99 (1985) (observing the
increase in caseload per judge and suggesting methods by which magistrates could
increase judicial productivity).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 1629. The fundamental purpose of the Act was "to cull from the
ever-growing workload of the U.S. district courts matters that are more desirably
performed by a lower tier of judicial officers." Id. at 4255.
25. See 'upra note 4.
26. Congress recognized that the terms of the Act must be rather broad to permit
judges to take an active role in determining the character of the new office. On that
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District judges embraced the concept and exercised consider-
able ingenuity in assigning duties to magistrates. Courts of ap-
peals were occasionally less enthusiastic with the district courts'
innovations, however, and disallowed transfer of certain duties
to magistrates that the statute did not authorize.
Congress amended the Act in 1976? and again in 1979. 9 Both
amendments were responses to judicial oppositions and in re-
cognition of what Congress, courts, and commentators considered
to be the extreme success of the program.31 In its current ver-
sions2 the Act confers far greater powers on magistrates than
the 1968 version did. Most notably, a judge may refer any civil
cases or misdemeanor 34 to a magistrate, so long as the parties
consent. Upon referral, the magistrate hears the case and may
enter a final judgment in the matter; parties may thereupon
appeal to an appropriate United States court of appeals.35
In the 1976 and 1979 amendments, Congress attempted to
clarify the types of tasks contemplated in an elastic provision of
theory, the Act
allows U.S. magistrates to be assigned duties by the judges of the US.
district courts in addition to those normally undertaken by U.S. commission-
ers today. These additional duties may include, but are not limited to, service
as special masters, supervision of pretrial or discovery proceedings, and
preliminary consideration of petitions for postconviction relief.
H.R. REP. No. 1629 (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., United States v. France, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991) (affirming a lower court
ruling that the Act did not give a magistrate authority to empanel a jury for a felony
trial); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 472 (1974) (holding that a magistrate could not
render a decision in a prisoner habeas corpus petition); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d
348, 359 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that a magistrate could not hear a motion to dismiss or
a motion for summary judgment).
28. Pub. L. No. 94-577, S 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (1976).
29. Federal Magistrates Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (1979).
30. See cases cited supra note 27.
31. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir.
1989) (noting the vital role magistrates play in keeping the federal courts working), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211 (1990); Burnett, supra note 23, at 299 (discussing the po3itive
impact magistrates have had on the federal judicial system).
32. 28 U.S.C. SS 631-639 (1988).
33. See supra note 13.
34. A magistrate's authority to preside at a misdemeanor trial is established by statute:
"When specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts
he serves, any United States magistrate shall have jurisdiction to try persons accused
of, and sentence persons convicted of, misdemeanors committed within that judicial
district. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (1988).
35. 28 U.S.C. S 636(c)(3). Another provision in the Act allows the parties to agree to
appeal to a district judge without waiving their right to appeal eventually to a United
States court of appeals. Id. S 636(cX4), (5).
258
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the Act that allowed judges to assign to magistrates "such
additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States."' ' The legislative history accom-
panying the Act indicates that its sponsors sought to encourage
judges to be creative in their utilization of magistrates and not
to constrain them to the tasks and duties mentioned explicitly
in the Act.3
The fundamental purpose behind the 1968 Act was to relieve
federal district judges of some of the burdens caused by the
rapidly growing federal docket.s In the years since the original
passage of the Act, the pressures on the federal docket have
grown even greater.s Some commentators have suggested that
magistrates now play such a vital role that the federal judicial
system could not function without them.40
Few of the objections to the expanded role of the magistrates
challenge the competence of federal magistrates themselves.
Judges and commentators on both sides of the controversy agree
that magistrates are highly qualified and extremely competent.41
36. Id. S 636(bX3).
37. See supra note 26; see also, H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162.
If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magis-
trates of other functions in aid of the business of the courts, there will be
increased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance
of their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties, and a consequent benefit
to both efficiency and the quality of justice in the Federal courts.
Id. at 6172.
38. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1469, 1469-70; HR. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4252,4254-55; H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6162, 6164. The Senate Report accompanying the 1979 amendment included another
consideration that may have been implicit in the earlier laws, but was not clearly stated:
"[T]o ... improve access to the Federal courts for the less-advantaged . . . provid[ing]
the opportunity for access to the judicial forum for all Americans." S. REP. No. 74.
39. See Richard A. Posner, Coping With the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates and
Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2215, 2215 n.2 (1989) (citing ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
Or THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTs (1961 & 1987)). The number
of cases filed annually in federal district courts increased by well over 300%/ between
1961 and 1987; filings in United States Courts of Appeals over the same period increased
by over 800%. Id.
40. See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 23, at 299 (noting that the federal district courts have
become far more efficient as magistrates have assumed greater responsibilities-court
productivity increased from an average of 201 civil cases per judge in 1979 to 368 civil
cases per judge per year in 1982).
41. See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d
537, 555 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "magistrates should
be awarded Article III protections commensurate with the Article III work that they
now so commendably perform"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Posner, supra note 39,
at 2216-17 (noting that the concerns over expanded powers for magistrates center around
jurisdiction under Article III, and not the magistrates' abilities).
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In establishing the magistrate system and granting magistrates
such broad powers, however, real concern exists that Congress
has exceeded the bounds of Article III.
Article III Requirements
Article III of the Constitution creates an independent branch
of government to exercise the "judicial power" of the United
States.42 Because Article III does not define the limits of the
judicial realm, the Supreme Court on occasion must decide whether
an act of Congress impermissibly extends or restricts the judicial
power. 3
The Constitution provides for judges protected by lifetime
tenure and undiminishable salary.44 The Framers sought to create
an incorruptible and impartial judiciary 5 contrary to their ex-
periences with the colonial courts, which were often controlled
and manipulated by the British monarch or local legislative bod-
ies.48 Article III's tenure and salary guarantees provide for a
42. The Constitution provides that
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, S 1.
43. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71-
72, 76 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that non-Article III bankruptcy judges could hear
only matters not arising under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 50-51, 56 (1932) (stating that Congress could not vest an agency with the power finally
to determine facts that affect the constitutional rights of a citizen); see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the Court's authority to review
acts of Congress, Chief Justice Marshall noted that "[iut is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
44. See supra note 42. The Supreme Court has interpreted the term "good behaviour"
to mean lifetime tenure. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 551 (1933). The
impeachment standards in Article H of the Constitution govern removal of judges. U.S.
CONST. art. II, S 4 (listing "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours.").
45. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed. 1987).
Hamilton noted that because of the Article I guarantees, "[a] man may then be sure of
the ground upon which he stands, and can never be deterred from his duty by the
apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situatiob." Id.
46. See Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 CoLuM. L. RaV.
671, 679-83 (1980) (noting that "the power to fix salaries [was in] the colonial assemblies,
where it was often effectively employed to elicit judicial loyalty"). Control of judges by
the British monarch may have been an even greater concern to American colonists than
were abuses by local legislatures. As a result of the increasing willingness of colonial
judges to challenge the legality of orders from Britain, Parliament passed a series of
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countermajoritarian force both to preserve individual rights in
the face of public pressure and also to create a strong and
independent branch of the federal government in accordance with
the separation of powers scheme. 7 Tenure and salary protection
ensured that although Congress would have the authority to
create inferior courts,4 the characteristics of the judges of those
courts would already be established.49
Although Article I's provisions operate to protect litigants,50
Article IH does not actually create rights that inhere in liti-
gants.51 Rather, the terms of Article HI pertain to the structure
resolutions in the 1770's designed to exert greater control over colonial judges by
manipulating their compensation and the appointment process. The effect was to render
the colonial judiciary absolutely at the mercy of the Crown. Id. at 682-83.
The Declaration of Independence listed as one of the colonists' complaints that King
George M "ha[d] made judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices,
and the amount and payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.
1 (U.S. 1776), quoted in Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article Iff and Judicial Independence:
Why the New Bankruptcy Courts Are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297, 303 (1981).
47. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison each stress the critical
role that the judiciary must play in the Constitution's separation of powers scheme. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed. 1987) ("[ln a republic,
(judicial tenure] is a[n] . . . excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of
the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any
government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws"); see
also, id. No. 47, at 245-46 (James Madison) ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny:', id. No. 79, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[W]e can never hope to see realized
in practice the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any
system, which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resource on the occasional
grants of the latter.").
48. Congress has the authority "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."
U.S. CONST. art. L S 8, cl. 9.
49. See J. Anthony Downs, Comment, The Boundaries ofArticle L. Delegation of Final
Decisionmaking Autor-ity to Magstrates, 52 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 1032, 1036-38 (1985) (discussing
five basic rationales for guarantees of tenure and salary: to ensure that the judiciary is
free to preserve individual rights; to preserve the judicial branch as a real element of
the separation of powers structure; to prevent individual judges from exercising influence
over one another-, to control federal legislative or executive incursions on state sover-
eignty; and to increase public confidence in the judiiary, see also Krattenmaker, supra
note 46, at 303:
[Tihe first section of article III was intended to impose a specific limitation
on the power of Congress and the Executive to create a federal judicial
system. The framers intended that if Congress and the President wished to
establish a federal judicial office, they first would have to guarantee members
of that office independence from the other two branches.
50. See Kaufman, supra note 46, at 687 n.99 ("The separation of powers is grounded in
a need to protect the citizenry rather than the occupants of official positions within each
branch.").
51. See Krattenmaker, supra note 46, at 304, which states that
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of the federal government.5 2 The Framers recognized that if
Congress or the Executive could exercise control over the tenure
and compensation of federal judges, the judiciary would cease to
play a key role in the system of checks and balances.s Litigants
benefit, of course, from the guarantees of impartial adjudication, '
but this fact does not obscure the central purpose of Article HI:
to establish firmly the judiciary as a key component of the federal
government.
The term "separation of powers" does not actually mean that
each branch is absolutely independent of the others; at times the
powers and duties of each branch of the federal government
necessarily overlap. Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Steel
Seizure Casess sums up the modern conception of the relationship
between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary: "[The
Constitution] enjoins upon its branches separateness but inter-
dependence, autonomy but reciprocity.6 Despite the Court's
recognition that the branches cannot be hermetically sealed off
from each other, excessive encroachment by one branch into the
Article III provides no constitutional right to trial of any cases before a
tenured judge. But it does require that Congress, as lawmaker, not grant to
itself or to the Executive controls over judges who apply that law. The
relevant constitutional provision establishes a principle of separation of
powers, not an individual constitutional right or liberty.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 411 (1973)); see also
Posner, supra note 39, at 2217 ("The independent judiciary ordained by Article III is not
merely a convenience for litigants.").
52. This Note addresses at length the structural aspect of Article I, particularly as
it relates to a party's ability to waive compliance with the Article's requirements. See
infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text. For a thorough treatment of the due process
concerns surrounding delegation to magistrates, see Raymond P. Bolanos, Note, Magis-
trates and Felony Voir Dire: A Threat to Fundmental Fairness?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 827
(1989).
53. See Downs, supra note 49, at 1036 n.24.
The Supreme Court has stated emphatically that the "primary purpose" of
the salary protections is "to promote that independence of action and judg-
ment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and
pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice
without respect to persons and with equal concern for the poor and the
rich."
Id. (quoting Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 253 (1920)).
54. The benefit accruing to litigants from independent judges goes more to satisfying
the due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments than toward
explaining Article Urs role in the framework of the Constitution. See supra notes 50-54
and accompanying text.
55. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
56. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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sphere of another has met with stiff opposition on a number of
occasions.57 When the Court has carved out exceptions to Article
III allowing Congress to exercise adjudicative authority, it has
been careful to ensure that such action constituted no threat to
the integrity of Article III.58
Under narrowly defined circumstances, Congress may vest
adjudicative authority in non-Article III courts or officers. This
vesting of authority may take the form of either a legislative
court or an adjunct officer to an Article III court.
Legislative Courts-9
The Supreme Court has approved the creation of legislative
courts in three discrete areas: territorial courts, military courts,
and the adjudication of congressionally created rights. The au-
thority establishing territorial courts is hot Article III, but Con-
gress' Article IV imprimatur to govern territories of the United
States.60 Judges in territorial courts, therefore, are not guaran-
teed the salary and tenure rights of Article 111.61 Similarly, the
authority to establish military tribunals derives from Article I's
57. See, e.g., id. at 587-89 (rejecting an attempt by the President to exercise power
implicitly denied him by Congress); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1986)
(holding invalid provisions of a statute that would have allowed an officer under con-
gressional control to exercise executive authority); Immigration and Naturalization Serv.
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto provisions which allowed
Congress to exercise executive authority); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 629 (1935) limiting the President's removal power over an officer created by
Congress).
58. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.25
(1982) (plurality opinion) ("When [the exceptions to Article III] are properly constrained,
they do not threaten the Framers' vision of an independent Federal Judiciary.").
59. For a thorough treatment of the legislative court doctrine, see Northern Pipeline,
458 U.S. at 63-70; see also Downs, supra note 49, at 1038-42.
60. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States . . . :' U.S. CONST. art. IV, S 3. Article I provides Congress with
the authority to "exercise exclusive legislation" over the District of Columbia. I&. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 17. On the basis of that grant of authority, the Supreme Court has rejected
challenges to the constitutionality of non-Article III courts in the District. See Palmore
v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973).
61. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64 (citing American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.)) (Suggesting that in the territories, Congress is
the equivalent of both a state and federal government. In the exercise of its authority
to govern the territories, Congress may create courts that are outside the parameters
of Article III.).
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grant to Congress of the power to create and regulate the armed
forces.6 2 On the basis of that explicit delegation of authority to
Congress, military courts are not subject to the strictures of
Article III.6 Finally, the Court has stated that Congress has the
power to create non-Article HI courts for the adjudication of
"public rights." Under the heading of public rights are matters
historically reserved to either the executive or legislative branch
that Congress could have committed completely to nonjudicial
determination. 65
The legislative court doctrine can operate to relieve Congress
of the restrictions imposed by Article III. Under certain circum-
stances, therefore, Congress may create tribunals that are nearly
indistinguishable from Article III courts in form and function,
but Congress need not extend guarantees of tenure and salary
to judges in those tribunals. Recent case law indicates that the
Court is hesitant to expand the parameters of the legislative
62. Congress has the authority "[tlo make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 14.
63. The extent of this authority is indicated by the Court's holding in Dynes v. Hoover,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857) (finding that Congress' "power to [create military courts]
is given without any connection between it and the third article of the Constitution
defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed, that the two powers are entirely
independent of each other."). The Court has been careful to ensure that military courts
do not exceed their authority by deciding matters beyond their jurisdiction and properly
belonging before an Article III court. See, e.g., United States ex reL Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (holding that a civilian could not be court-martialed for offenses
committed while in the military).
64. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272
(1856), which established the public rights prong of the doctrine and declared that
there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may
deem proper.
Id. at 284.
65. Social Security claims provide a clear example of the types of matters that fall
within the domain of public rights. Because Congress has created certain rights by
statute, it may also create the forum that determines whether those rights have been
abridged and what remedies are available. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339
(1976) (upholding referral of preliminary review of Social Security appeals to the Social
Security Administration Appeals Council). See generally Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
The understanding of these cases is that the Framers expected that Congress
would be free to commit such matters completely to non-judicial executive
determination, and that as a result there can be no constitutional objection
to Congress' employing the less drastic expedient of committing their deter-
mination to a legislative court or an administrative agency.
Id. at 68.
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court doctrine. In essence, congressional authority to create
non-Article III adjudicative bodies remains strictly limited to the
three categories listed above: territorial courts, military courts,
and public rights.
Adjunct Officers
Judicial resistance to expansion of the legislative court doctrine
does not mean that Article III requires a judge to perform all
judicial acts.67 The adjunct officer's authority arises out of Article
III; although the office itself originates from an Article I grant
of power,a the adjunct acts within the jurisdiction of the Article
III court that delegates tasks to him.69 Traditionally, adjuncts
have exercised limited authority, often in the area of factfinding
and determining the issues before the court. 70
66. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70. After a lengthy discussion of the history and
development of the legislative court doctrine, the Court summarized the doctrine's current
status in very limiting terms:
In sum, this Court has identified three situations in which Art. I does not
bar the creation of legislative courts. In each of these situations, the Court
has recognized certain exceptional powers bestowed upon Congress by the
Constitution or by historical consensus. Only in the face of such an exceptional
grant of power has the Court declined to hold the authority of Congress
subject to the general prescriptions of Art. III.
Id. (footnote omitted).
67. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (stating that "there is no
requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all
determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges"). Adjuncts have
a long history of service in the judicial process, dating back to the early British court
system. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258. Federal courts have traditionally
employed adjunct officers, such as masters and referees, to assist federal judges in a
wide variety of carefully circumscribed tasks. See infra note 70 and accompanying text
(discussing the characteristics and functions of adjunct officers); see also, Note, Masters
and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. REv. 779, 789-93 (1975) (discussing the
role of adjuncts in federal courts in the early twentieth century).
68. Congress has the power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court:'
U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, c. 9. Courts have deemed the power to create adjunct officers a
"necessary and proper" corollary to this power. See, e.g., Ram Constr. Co. v. Port Auth.
of Allegheny County, 49 B.R. 363, 365 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that the Constitution
authorizes Congress to create adjuncts as a necessary and proper corollary to its authority
to create a federal bankruptcy law).
69. "When a case is tried before a magistrate, jurisdiction remains in the district court
and is simply exercised through the medium of the magistrate:' Hearings on the Federal
Magistrates Act Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1966-67).
70. See Downs, supra note 49, at 1042 (noting that proceedings conducted by adjuncts
such as masters and commissioners "were subject to the direction of the court and their
findings, at least as to matters of law, were essentially advisory") (footnote omitted).
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The Supreme Court has approved the delegation of power to
adjuncts so long as the delegation does not deprive Article III
courts of the "essential attributes" of judicial power.7 ' The es-
sential attributes test requires that an Article Ill judge retain
the power to decide all questions of law, and that the adjunct's
authority be narrowly drawn and of an essentially advisory
nature.72
Federal magistrates are adjunct officers, in that they exist to
aid federal district judges in managing the court's docket. The
Court applied the essential attributes test to the Federal Mag-
istrates Act in United States v. Raddatz.73 The Court upheld the
delegation to magistrates of potentially dispositive pretrial mo-
tions on the ground that the judge maintained control over the
proceedings.7 4 Because the judge retained the authority to render
any final decision, the involvement of the magistrate in Raddatz
did not violate Article III.
The Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.75 affirmed the Raddatz analysis. Northern
Pipeline involved a challenge to the authority of bankruptcy
judges created by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.76 The Court found
that the Act's broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges
gave them the authority to hear claims that were not grounded
in the terms of the Act.77 In light of these powers, the Court
held that bankruptcy judges were not merely adjuncts but com-
prised an independent judicial body separate from Article III
71. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
72. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78-79
(1982) (plurality opinion) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682-84 (1980)). The
Court found that delegation of authority to an adjunct is constitutionally permissible
where "the ultimate decisionmaking authority" remains at all times with the district
court. Id.
73. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
74. See id. at 680-81 (maintaining that essential to the control is the availability of the
judge for immediate review).
75. 458 U.S. 50.
76. Pub. L. No. 95-598, S 201(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2657-60 (current version at 28 U.S.C.S151-158 (1988)).
77. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84. The Court found that provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act granting bankruptcy judges jurisdiction over '"all civil proceedings arising under
[the Act] or arising in or related to cases under' the Act unconstitutionally conferred
Article III powers on non-article III judges. Id. at 85 (quoting 28 U.S.C. S 1471(b) (1976
ed., Supp. IV)). Because the broad statutory grant of authority gave bankruptcy judges
jurisdiction over state law rights and claims that were not of Congress' creation, the
Court found that the bankruptcy judges' authority was coextensive with the authority
of district judges despite the fact that bankruptcy judges' lacked constitutional guarantees
of tenure and salary. See id. at 84-87.
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courts, beyond the ambit of the legislative court doctrine, and
were therefore unconstitutional7 8
Northern Pipeline stands for the proposition that Congress may
not exercise its authority to create non-Article III courts or
officers so as to invade the province of Article HI.79 The Consti-
tution dogmatically reserves some judicial functions to officials
who possess tenure and salary protection. Creative attempts to
delegate that authority to alternative fora or officials have run
afoul of Article I
Voir Dire
By passing the Federal Magistrates Act, Congress strongly
encouraged judges to use magistrates in tasks that would free
the judges for case supervision and trial work.8' Although the
Act does not expressly mention voir dire, judges have regularly
delegated to magistrates the role of empaneling juries in felony
trials. Given the protracted and repetitive nature of voir dire,
such a development was inevitable. Participation by magistrates
in voir dire has become a routine practice in many jurisdictionses
and appellate courts initially approved of the practice.P
In the latter half of the 1980's, at least one court of appeals
suggested that the statute did not empower magistrates to con-
duct voir dire in felony trials. In United States v. Ford,84 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
78. See id. The Court's analysis identified a key distinction between the legislative
court doctrine and adjunct officers: Congress simply does not have the same authority
to create adjuncts to adjudicate constitutionally recognized rights as it does to address
statutorily created rights. Id. at 81-82.
79. Id. at 87. "Although the cases relied upon by appellants demonstrate that inde-
pendent courts are not required for a/ federal adjudications, those cases also make it
clear that where Art. I does apply, all of the legislative powers specified in Art. I and
elsewhere are subject to it." Id. at 73.
80. See id. at 84 (referring to "historically judicial functions" that an Article III judge
must perform, but failing to enumerate those functions). The Court has yet to provide
an exhaustive definition of the tasks only judges may perform. This Note proposes a new
method of analysis to determine whether magistrates, as non-Article III officers, may
undertake inherently judicial duties. See inf-a notes 220-33 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 3740 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 873 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that
"[tihe Legal Manual for United States Magistrates lists as an 'additional duty' the
'[c]onduct of voir dire and selection of juries for district judges.' ").
83. See, e.g., United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1063 (1986); United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1984).
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985); Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d at 874.
84. 824 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1034 (1988).
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banc, rejected the reasoning of a panel decisiona' that found the
"additional duties" provision in the Federal Magistrates Act
permitted a magistrate to conduct voir dire.86 The en banc deci-
sion pointed out that the involvement of magistrates in the voir
dire process posed "grave constitutional questions"ar7 and that a
district court should not allow it to occur.P The court then
affirmed the conviction on the ground that the defendant had
received a fair trial89 and had not objected to the magistrate's
actions.9
The en banc decision in Ford noted and rejected dicta contained
in an earlier case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, United States v. Rivera-Sola.9' In Rivera-
Sola, the court affirmed a criminal conviction because of the
defendant's failure to object at trial 2 and her inability to show
prejudice arising from the magistrate's conduct of the voir dire.93
The First Circuit went a step further, however, and stated
explicitly that participation by the magistrate in voir dire was
entirely proper, and the court strongly endorsed the practice.9 4
The en banc court in Ford rejected Rivera-Solas approach to
voir dire and stated directly that the Federal Magistrates Act
does not empower magistrates to conduct voir dire.95
Gomez v. United States"
As indicated by the conflict between the Ford and Rivera-Sola
decisions, a serious split developed among the circuits regarding
85. United States v. Ford, 797 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1070
(1987).
86. Id- at 1333. Neither side had objected at trial to the participation of the magistrate
in voir dire. Ford 824 F.2d at 1432.
87. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1430.
88. Id. at 1438.
89. Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a conviction may
be reversed only if the appellant makes a showing that the appealable error unfairly
prejudiced him or affected the basic fairness of the trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); see infra
note 121 (discussing the plain error doctrine).
Because Ford was unable to offer any positive evidence that she was adversely affected
by the involvement of the magistrate, and because the trial was fundamentally fair, the
court upheld the conviction despite the error. Ford 824 F.2d at 1438-39.
90. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1438-39 (affirming conviction on basis of fundamental fairness of
trial and defendant's failure to object).
91. 713 F.2d 866 (1st Cir. 1983).
92. See id. at 872.
93. Id. at 874.
94. See id. (observing that "a magistrate can effectively conduct the voir dire and
preside at the selection of juries in civil and criminal cases, thus saving valuable time
for our busy district court judges.").
95. United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1438 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
96. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
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the propriety of a magistrate conducting voir dire. The United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue in 1989 and held
unanimously in Gomez v. United States- that empanelment of a
jury by a magistrate over the defendant's objection constituted
reversible error.9 8 The Court rejected the government's argument
that the availability of a district judge to review the magistrate's
decisions sufficiently safeguarded the defendant's rights; because
of the special nature of the voir dire proceeding-in which a
venireman's reactions and gestures are often as important as his
responses to questions-review of the record by a judge was
particularly inadequate."
In reversing Gomez's conviction, the Court refused to consider
the constitutional issues raised in the case and based its decision
on statutory interpretation. I® Reviewing the wording of the "ad-
ditional duties" clause10' of the Federal Magistrates Act, the
Court found that participation in felony voir dire was not one of
the powers the statute expressly conferred upon magistrates.10 2
Because voir dire was not a function listed in the Act, a defendant
had a right to object and to request that a federal judge conduct
voir dire. The opinion raised the question but did not answer
whether Congress could, within the limits of the Constitution,
explicitly confer such authority on magistrates.0 3
The Court did not rule directly on whether a defendant's failure
to object at voir dire entitled him to the same protection. 104 This
97. Id.
98. Id. at 876.
99. See id. at 874-75 ("[W]e harbor serious doubts that a district judge could review
this function [vofr dire] meaningfully .... The court further must scrutinize not only
spoken words but also gestures and attitudes of all participants to ensure the jury's
impartiality:').
100. Id. at 864 (stating that the Court's "settled policy [is] to avoid an interpretation
of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative
interpretation poses no constitutional question").
101. 28 U.S.C. S 66(bX3) (1988).
102. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875-76.
103. Id. at 872 n.25 ("Because we decide that the Federal Magistrates Act does not
allow the delegation of jury selection to magistrates, we need not consider the second
question presented in this case; i.e., whether such a delegation would be constitutional.").
In construing S 636(bX3) of the Act (the "additional duties" clause), other courts have also
used its vague wording to avoid the constitutional issues raised. See, e.g., Wingo v.
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 467 n.4 (1974) (finding that the Act did not give magistrates
authority to hold evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus petitions, the Court "indicate[d]
no views as to the validity of investing such authority in a magistrate"); United States
v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1435 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that participation in felony
trial proceedings is not one of the additional duties contemplated by the Act: "[wle need
not decide whether Congress has the power to allow a district judge to delegate the trial
of felony cases to a magistrate"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1034 (1988).
104. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 860 (observing that Gomez did object at voir dire, but not
expressly limiting its holding to those facts).
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unanswered question led to even greater divisions between the
circuits as courts handled a flood of appeals from defendants who
had failed to object to the participation of a magistrate at voir
dire.105 Defendants contended that in light of the "solid wall"'1 6
of precedent that had existed in many jurisdictions supporting
the use of magistrates in voir dire prior to the Gomez decision,
the requirement of an objection would be unreasonable and unfair,
rewarding what would have been regarded at the time as abusive
behavior by counsel.' °7 In responding to these challenges, the
circuit courts of appeals have differed greatly in their evaluation
of the effect of a defendant's failure to object to the empanelment
of a jury by a magistrate. 0
United States v. France'09 and Peretz v. United States"0
In United States v. France,"' the defendant failed to object to
the use of the magistrate in voir dire'12 and was convicted by a
105. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Torres, 912 F.2d 1552, 1555 (lst Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (reversing conviction by finding defendant's failure to object "entirely excusable");
United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that Gomez mandated a per
se rule of reversibility, regardless of contemporaneous objection), affid, 111 S. Ct. 805
(1991); United States v. Vanwort, 887 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that Gomez only
requires reversal if defendant objected at voir dire), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1927 (1990);
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that
defendant's failure to object satisfies consent requirement), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211
(1990).
106. France, 886 F.2d at 228 (discussing pre-Gomez precedent in the Ninth Circuit for
empanelment of juries by magistrates).
107. Id. ("[It seems to us at best unseemly, and at worst irresponsible, to penalize
France for following the law as it existed at the time her jury was selected.").
108. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that in the absence
of an objection, no error exists. The defendant waives his right to an Article III judge
by failing to object at voir dire. The objection therefore may not be raised at a later
time. Williams, 892 F.2d at 312. The First Circuit stated that when a solid wall of pre-
Gomez precedent has led a defendant to refrain from objecting at voir dire, the defendant
may raise the objection on appeal. Martinez-Torres, 912 F.2d at 1555. Finally, the Ninth
Circuit held that the involvement of a magistrate at voir dire is inappropriate regardless
of whether the defendant objects and constitutes per se grounds for reversal. France,
886 F.2d at 228.
109. 886 F.2d 223.
110. 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991).
111. 886 F.2d 223.
112. Michael Levine, the public defender who represented Darlina France at the trial
and appellate levels and argued her case before the Supreme Court, pointed out that he
failed to object to the participation of the magistrate because at the time of the trial
(well before the Gomez decision was handed down), the magistrate's right to involvement
was so well established that any objection was futile. Interview with Michael Levine,
Federal Public Defender, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 2, 1990). Levine raised the objection
for the first time on appeal. The Ninth Circuit panel reversed France's conviction, ruling
that Gomez mandated a per se rule of reversibility. France, 886 F.2d at 228.
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jury.118 The panel reversed the defendant's conviction through an
expansive interpretation of the Gomez holding which suggested
that participation of a magistrate in voir dire constituted per se
grounds for reversal.114
In her brief to the Supreme Court, France argued that the
Constitution does not permit the referral of voir dire to magis-
trates, declaring that referral "violates the structural require-
ments of Article III."' " Because Article III provides a
"nonwaivable structural safeguard,' 6 France's failure to object
at voir dire should not have affected her right to appeal on that
issue and to obtain reversal of her conviction1 17
The government focused on the procedural safeguards and
requirements rather than on the constitutional issues. Its brief
challenged the validity of a "futility exception"" 8 to the contem-
poraneous objection doctrine 19 on the ground that such an ex-
ception would be unmanageable.' 20 Moreover, the government
argued that the plain error doctrine 2' provided adequate protec-
tion to litigants whose rights or interests were affected through
a failure of counsel.'2
113. France, 886 F.2d at 225.
114. Id. at 228.
115. Brief for Respondent at *1, United States v. France, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1990) (No. 89-
1363) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id.
118. Brief for Petitioner at *2-5, France (No. 89-1363). The term "futility exception"
mirrors the "solid wall of precedent" analysis. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying
text. France argued on appeal that an objection raised at trial would have been futile,
so defense counsel's failure to object to the magistrate's participation in voir dire should
be excused. Brief for Respondent at *2-3, France (No. 89-1363).
119. The "raise-or-waive" rule requires that a party object at trial in order to preserve
a right of appeal on the matter. The objection serves to place the trial judge on notice
as to possible improprieties and allows him to address the situation immediately. WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMUNAL PROCEDURE S 26.5(c) (1985) (quoting State v.
Applegate, 591 P.2d 371, 373 (1979)).
120. "[IThe futility exception would raise difficult questions regarding the role of the
attorney's state of mind in determining whether a particular claim should have been
raised at trial:' Brief for Respondent at *7, France (No. 89-1363). The government raised
other concerns including whether a futility exception could apply even if an attorney was
unaware of the state of the law regarding the issue, and whether the exception would
apply where the attorney honestly believed an objection would be futile but simply
misinterpreted the law. Id. at *7-8.
121. FED. R. CRim. P. 52b). The plain error doctrine provides that an appellate court
may reverse a lower court's ruling despite defendant's failure to object during the trial
if reversal is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note
119, at S 26.5(d).
122. Reply Brief for Petitioner, at *10-11, France (No. 89-1363).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The government's brief stressed the tremendous impact that
adoption of France's argument would have on the judicial system
in terms of efficiency and case management. 1 Its brief further
suggested that consent, internal delegation, and appellate review
by an Article III judge suffice to allay separation of powers
concerns.12 4
The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in
United States v. France25 on October 2, 1990. In a one sentence
per curiam opinion, an evenly divided Court affirmed the decision
of the Ninth Circuit panel establishing a per se rule of reversi-
bility.126
The same day that the Court affirmed France, it granted
certiorari in Peretz v. United States, 27 a case from the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit procedurally indistinguishable
from France. In Peretz, the defendant was charged with importing
four kilograms of heroin.128 At voir dire, counsel for the defendant
agreed to have a magistrate empanel the jury.129 The magistrate
conducted voir dire, and after trial, the jury convicted Peretz on
all counts. Counsel for Peretz first raised the issue of the mag-
istrate's participation on appeal to the Second Circuit.
Peretz, like France, argued that Gomez v. United States'30
mandated reversal of the conviction on the theory that the
magistrate lacked authority to participate in a felony trial. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's
argument, and affirmed the defendant's conviction, based on the
court's settled rule that Gomez requires reversal only when the
123. The government pointed out the far-reaching implications of France's Article I
analysis:
If respondent is correct in her view of the restrictions imposed by Article
III on the use of magistrates, then far more is at stake than magistrate-
conducted voir dire in felony jury trials. The authority of magistrates, on
consent, to conduct misdemeanor trials or even to conduct voir dire in
misdemeanor cases would be at risk, since nothing in Article III distinguishes
between misdemeanors and felonies . . . . Magistrates participate in or try
a huge number of misdemeanor and civil cases each year, so the consequences
of accepting respondent's submission are quite significant.
Id. at *11-12 (footnotes omitted).
124. Id. at *13-14.
125. 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991).
126. Justice David Souter took no part in the decision.
127. 904 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 781, afid, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991).
128. Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2663 (1991).
129. Id. at 2663 n.2 (quoting the transcript of the voir dire).
130. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
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defendant objected to the participation of the magistrate. 81 The
court found that Peretz had consented to have his jury empanel-
led by a magistrate, and the conviction therefore was proper.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the issues left unanswered by the split in France.8 2 In briefing
the case, counsel for Peretz offered arguments identical to those
made by defense counsel in France: first, that Article III prohibits
delegation of voir dire to magistrates;13s and second, that the
contemporaneous objection doctrine should not bar defendant's
appeal, both because defendant's silence did not constitute con-
sent and because a defendant cannot empower a magistrate to
conduct voir dire simply by agreeing to the procedure.'3 Finally,
counsel argued that Gomez was not limited to situations in which
a defendant objected at voir dire.as
The government argued that Peretz's failure to object consti-
tuted a waiver of his right to object, and that the facts of the
case did not merit the finding of an exception to the contempo-
raneous objection doctrine.' 6 The government's brief in Peretz
conceded that referral of voir dire to a magistrate was error, as
a matter of statutory construction and constitutional interpreta-
tion.137 Despite the admission that the magistrate's participation
131. Peretz, 904 F.2d at 34 (affirmance order) (applying rule from United States v.
Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1990), which held that magistrates may conduct voir
dire if defendant fails to object).
132. 111 S. Ct. 781 (1991). The Court granted certiorari, limited to the following three
questions:
1. Does 28 U.S.C., Section 636, permit a magistrate to conduct the voir dire
in a felony trial if the defendant consents?
2. If 28 U.S.C., Section 636, permits a magistrate to conduct a felony trial
voir dire provided that the defendant consents, is the statute consistent with
Article II?
3. If the magistrates supervision of the voir dire in petitioner's trial was
error, did the conduct of petitioner and his attorney constitute a waiver of
the right to raise this error on appeal?
Id.
133. Brief for Petitioner at *1316, Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991) (No.
90-615) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
134. Id. at *16, *30-35.
135. Id. at *13-14 (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989)) (arguing that the
defendant's objection "was irrelevant to the Court's determination" in Gomez).
136. Brief for Respondent at *9-13, Peretz (No. 90-615).
137. Id. at *8-9.
[W]e agree with petitioner ... that Gomez forecloses the argument that the
statute may be read to authorize magistrate-conducted voir dire when the
defendant consents. The Magistrates Act, as construed by this Court, does
not give magistrates the power to preside over jury selection. A defendant's
consent cannot supply the statutory authority Congress did not provide.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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was error, however, the government nevertheless urged that the
Court affirm the conviction on the basis of the defendant's failure
to objectlas
In a five-four split, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.s 9 Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, held that Gomez should be limited to its facts, but
when a defendant fails to object, the defendant has waived his
rights, rendering Gomez inapplicable. 140 The Court relied heavily
on the "additional duties" clause of the Federal Magistrates Act
to support its conclusion.14' Congress intended to allow district
judges to experiment freely in assigning tasks to magistrates,
and the majority found that voir dire was within the sphere of
additional duties. 42
The Court rejected the government's stated position that re-
ferral of voir dire to a magistrate constituted error.143 To the
contrary, the Court articulated a rule that limited the decision
in Gomez to its facts, so that a magistrate may empanel a jury
so long as the defendant does not object.144
The majority downplayed the significance of the concerns raised
in Gomez, namely the efficacy of appellate review of a voir dire
proceeding, and the appropriateness of such a delegation in the
context of Article ]lI. 14 In discussing Article III, the Court
138. Id.
139. 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991).
140. Id. at 2664-65.
141. Id. at 2666-67. For a thorough discussion of "additional duties," see supra notes
36-37 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 2667 (noting that Congress included the additional duties clause as a "broad
residuary" of authority, and that the Court "should not foreclose constructive experi-
ments").
143. Id. at 2671.
We note, however, that the Solicitor General conceded that it was error
to make the reference to the Magistrate in this case .... Although that
concession deprived us of the benefit of an adversary presentation, it of
course does not prevent us from adopting the legal analysis of those Courts
of Appeals that [limit the operation of the rule in Gomez to situations where
the defendant objects at voir dire].
Id.
144. I&
145. In Gomez, the Court stated that it had grave doubts as to whether a district
judge could effectively review a magistrate's actions in voir dire. Gomez v. United States,
490 U.S. 858, 874-75 (1989). The majority in Peretz suggested that such concerns, though
still very real, are alleviated by the possibility of objecting to the participation of the
magistrate. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2668-69 n.12. Despite the Court's casual dismissal of the
matter, the consent of the defendant does not increase the effectiveness of judicial review.
The Court in Gomez held that "it is unlikely that [Congress] intended to allow a magistrate
to conduct jury selection without procedural guidance or judicial review." Gomez, 490
U.S. at 873-74. Effective review is lacking, irrespective of the defendant's consent or
waiver.
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emphasized the importance of consent in the determination of
whether a violation of Article III has occurred. 146 The decision
minimized the structural significance of Article III and suggested
that Article III acts almost exclusively to safeguard personal
rights.147 By ignoring the importance of Article III in the sepa-
ration of powers scheme, the Court was able to focus on due
process concerns. Because the trial was fundamentally fair, and
because Peretz could not establish that the magistrate's partici-
pation had prejudiced him, the Court affirmed the conviction.
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices White and
Blackmun, contended that the concerns the Court discussed in
Gomez were not contingent upon whether a defendant did or did
not object at voir dire.14 Rather, the problems associated with
appellate review and internal delegation arise independently of
the defendant's actions. Marshall also rejected the majority's
reliance on the consent of the defendant, finding instead that
consent is irrelevant to the constitutional issues and to the
interpretation of the statute.149
Justice Marshall suggested that the Court was not being faith-
ful to its established precedent regarding Article III, out of a
desire to achieve a particular outcome: "The majority simply
dismisses altogether the seriousness of the underlying constitu-
tional question . . . . It is only by unacceptably manipulating
our Article III teachings that the majority succeeds in avoiding
the difficulty that attends its construction of the Act."15 The
majority recognized that the realities of litigation in the federal
court system today require permitting federal magistrates to
handle a wide variety of tasks.
146. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2667 ("The considerations that led to our holding in Gomez
do not lead to the conclusion that a magistrate's 'additional duties' may not include
supervision of jury selection when the defendant has consented.").
147. Id. at 2665-66 & n.6.
148. Id. at 2672 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent focussed on whether
the defendant could raise the issue of the magistrate's participation on appeal, without
having objected at trial. Justice Scalia did state that, on the merits, he was in general
agreement with Justice Marshall's position. Id- at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. I& at 2673 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the determination of whether
the Federal Magistrates Act permits a magistrate to conduct voir dire "is not at all
affected by a defendant's consent.").
150. Id. at 2676 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia recognized that
allowing magistrates to assume additional responsibilities would be in the best interest
of the judicial system, but found the majority's approach unsound: "while there may be
persuasive reasons why the use of a magistrate in these circumstances is constitutional,
the Court does not provide them today." Id. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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THE BOUNDARIES OF ARTICLE III ANALYSIS
Peretz provides an example of the Court twisting its Article
III doctrine to fit a situation for which that doctrine was not
designed. As this section demonstrates, faithful application of the
Court's teachings to the Federal Magistrates Act leads to the
conclusion that Article III permits only very limited delegations
of authority to magistrates.
Supporters of the Federal Magistrates Act posit several ar-
guments for finding that the Act does not violate Article III.
These rationales fall into two distinct groups: general exceptions
to Article III that the Supreme Court recognizes"' and particular
aspects of the Act itself that protect its more suspect provisions
from constitutional infirmity.152
Legislative Courts
The Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.la5 indicates that the legislative
court doctrine will remain limited for the foreseeable future to
three narrow categories: military courts, territorial courts, and
the administration of public rights. The first two categories
arguably provide only a de minimis basis for extending the
authority of magistrates.154 The public rights prong5 of the
doctrine, however, offers some support for the delegation of a
151. The general exceptions are the legislative court doctrine and the adjunct officer
doctrine. See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
152. In particular, those sections of the Act that provide for delegation of duties to
magistrates entirely within the judicial branch require that litigants consent to the
participation of the magistrate and call for appellate review of the magistrate's actions
by an Article I judge. See 28 U.S.C. S 636(b), (c) (1988). Analytically, the best method
to examine these elements of the Act is under the adjunct officer doctrine, because they
go toward establishing whether the delegation robs the Article III court of the essential
attributes of judicial power. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
153. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
154. At least one recent case has suggested that the participation of the magistrate
in voir dire in a case tried in the United States Virgin Islands could not violate Article
III because of the explicit power Congress has to administer to territories of the United
States. See Government of the Virgin Islands v.'Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 314-15 (3d Cir.
1989) (Mansmann, J., concurring), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211 (1990). Federal magistrates
do not take part in military tribunals, and only a small fraction of the work done by
magistrates occurs in the territories of the United States. It is possible, of course, to
construct hypothetical situations in which a magistrate's authority would arise out of one
of the aforementioned prongs of the legislative court doctrine. As a practical matter,
however, such situations are not the norm and are not central to this analysis.
155. See supra notes 64-05 and accompanying text.
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number of tasks to magistrates. For example, in many jurisdic-
tions, magistrates devote a great deal of their time to hearing
appeals of decisions from the Social Security Commission.e Be-
cause Congress created the rights of the litigants by enacting
the Social Security Act, Congress may provide a forum other
than an Article HI court to adjudicate violations of those rights
and to determine what relief parties may obtain.'5 The foregoing
analysis fails to provide adequate support for the delegation to
magistrates of the authority to conduct voir dire in a felony trial;
these proceedings simply do not fit within the narrow parameters
of the public rights prong of the legislative court doctrine.1 8
Although the legislative court doctrine may validate some of the
tasks magistrates perform, that analysis does not support the
broad grants of authority at issue here. 59
Adjunct Officers
The legislative history accompanying the Federal Magistrates
Act of 1968 reveals that Congress intended magistrates to op-
erate as adjunct officers.160 The powers listed in the Act support
156. See CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES 84 (Federal
Judicial Center 1985) (observing that many districts issue a blanket order whereby all
social security cases are assigned at filing to magistrates).
157. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the sources and application
of Congress' authority to provide for tribunals other than Article III courts to address
rights Congress creates).
158. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70
(1982) (plurality opinion) (stating that although the public rights prong of the legislative
court doctrine applies to rights Congress creates, it does not apply to rights arising
under state or constitutional law).
159. As noted elsewhere, no one challenges the competence of the magistrates and
their ability to relieve some of the pressures on overcrowded dockets. See supra note 41
and accompanying text. The benefits of magistrate participation, however, threaten to
obscure the long-term danger to Article III values and the rights of litigants. See Reinier
H. Kraakman, Note, Article Iff Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal
Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1049 (1979) (observing that the
"magistrate system is susceptible to an inherent expansionist dynamic and that longrun
pressures toward mass consensual reference may be too intense for many district courts
to resist.").
160. The fact that Congress intended magistrates to replace commissioners, who were
also adjunct officers, strongly supports this contention. Although Congress created mag-
istrates to exercise more authority than commissioners, that does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Congress intended magistrates to exist outside the scope of traditional
adjunct officer analysis. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
essential attributes test). Rather, Congress recognized that judges underutilized the
commissioners and hoped the new lower tier of judicial officer would make a valuable
contribution in managing the docket of the federal court system. See supra notes 21-26
and accompanying text (reviewing legislative history of Federal Magistrates Act).
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the conclusion that magistrates were to have limited jurisdiction
in keeping with the traditional concept of the adjunct officer-
someone to assist an Article HI judge, in a mainly advisory
capacity and with authority to render final decisions in only the
most limited situations.161 The House and Senate reports accom-
panying the Act indicate that the purpose behind creating a corps
of magistrates mirrored the rationale behind the adjunct officer
doctrine: to provide an officer who would be available to perform
a variety of tasks an Article HI judge assigns. 16 2
The Federal Magistrates Act and its accompanying history,
however, offer no indication that Congress wished to destroy the
historical and constitutional limits on adjuncts.ca Rather, the Act
granted magistrates greater authority than their predecessors,
the United States commissioners, in recognition of the magis-
trates' superior qualifications.' Congress was keenly aware that
United States commissioners were often unprepared to deal with
sophisticated legal issues,ee and therefore incorporated into the
Federal Magistrates Act stringent requirements for the position.
Candidates for appointment to the federal magistracy must have
been a member of the Bar for at least five years, 16e and the
judges of the district court must find the candidate competent
for the office. 67
The elaborate structure for referral and oversight created
through the Federal Magistrates Act provides a powerful argu-
ment that the adjunct officer doctrine supports the recent ex-
pansion of magistrates' authority. The legislative history,
describing a lower tier of judicial officer to assist judges,M
161. See 28 U.S.C. S 636(b) (1988) (outlining the jurisdiction and powers of magistrates);
18 U.S.C. S 3401 (1979) (conferring misdemeanor jurisdiction on federal magistrates); see
also supra notes 22 & 26 and accompanying text (discussing historical functions of masters
and commissioners).
162. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (reviewing Congress' stated purpose
behind the Federal Magistrates Act).
164. The United States commissioners, because of defects in the system (discussed
supra note 22), did not exercise all of the authority available to adjunct officers. Both
Congress and district judges were hesitant to grant the commissioners powers that might
have exceeded their abilities. These fears did not accompany the new magistrate system.
See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between com-
missioners and magistrates).
165. See supra note 22 (discussing defects in the United States commissioner system).
166. 28 U.S.C. S 631(b)(1) (1988).
167. Id. S 631(b(2). The Act further provides that no one may serve as a magistrate
past the age of 70 unless a majority of the judges of the district vote each year to allow
the magistrate to continue in office. Id. S 631(d).
168. See supraz note 24 and accompanying text.
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coupled with the statute's provisions for the exercise of tight
control over magistrates by Article III judges,16 9 strongly sug-
gests that magistrates are indeed adjunct officers. The elements
of the Act that require the consent of the parties and provide
for appellate review and internal delegation all serve to support
this conclusion.170 Regardless of legislative intent and statutory
safeguards, however, one must concede that magistrates are
exercising more judicial authority than ever before.
The Court has developed and adhered to the essential attrib-
utes test to analyze whether a delegation of authority to adjunct
officers threatens core Article HI valuesY.7' The test requires a
single inquiry by the Court: whether the delegation of authority
to a magistrate robs an Article IlI court of the essential attributes
of judicial power or confers those attributes on a non-Article III
court or officer. 72
Congress has incorporated into the Federal Magistrates Act a
number of features to ensure the Act does not endanger Article
III values. These elements include the consent requirement, in-
ternal delegation, and the availability of review by an Article III
169. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1988) (providing for referral to a magistrate only
by an Article I judge and granting judges the authority to reconsider the magistrate's
rulings).
170. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at *15-16, United States v. France, 111 S. Ct. 805
(1991) (No. 89-1363) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) (noting that the consent require-
ment secures a defendant's rights and that all proceedings occur within the province of
the Article I court). The government also stressed that the status quo presents no
viable threat to the integrity of the judicial branch, because assignment to magistrates
"is not a case of a 'congressional attempt[] "to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III
tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating" constitutional courts.'" Id- at 14 (quoting
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (quoting National
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting))).
171. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982) (plurality opinion) (finding the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutional in part
because it conferred the essential attributes of judicial power on non-Article III bank-
ruptcy judges); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (holding that referral of an
evidentiary hearing to a magistrate was valid, because the judge retained ultimate
decisionmaldng authority).
172. In Northern Pipeline, the Court applied the essential attributes test, using it as a
tool to determine if a delegation of authority to a non-Article III officer breached the
values that underlie Article I. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81.
The Court's holding in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), provides valuable insight into separation of powers analysis. Chadha presented
the Court with a challenge to the legislative veto. Proponents of the mechanism argued
that its threat to the separation of powers was minimal and was vastly outweighed by
the benefits to an overburdened legislature and executive. Id at 967-74 (White, J.,
dissenting). The Court rejected these arguments and held the legislative veto unconsti-
tutional, stressing that in issues relating to the separation of powers, the boundaries
between the branches, although not impermeable, must be jealously guarded. Id. at 957-
59.
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judge.173 Courts facing Article°III challenges to magistrates have
given each of these elements a great deal of attention, but
consensus has proven elusive: courts of appeals have drawn very
different conclusions from the same statutory provisions. 174
Consent and Waiver
Consent of the parties is the cornerstone of a magistrate's
authority to preside over judicial proceedings. 7 5 The argument
in favor of allowing magistrates to preside on the basis of party
consent is straightforward: the right to an Article III judge is
simply one of the many constitutional rights a party may waive.176
173. A combination of historical necessity and efficiency is another consideration that
could justify extensive delegation of authority to magistrates, but courts have not used
it. This rationale suggests that the pressures of the growing federal caseload, in combi-
nation with the success that the magistrate system has enjoyed already, somehow
outweigh the concerns regarding Article III. The appeal of this analysis is that it focuses
on concrete issues, rather than ephemeral separation of powers concerns that do not
appear nearly so personal to individual litigants or judges. See Note, supra note 159, at
1050 (observing that no constituency exists for the Article III problems raised by the
Act; litigants care only for having their cases heard promptly, and overburdened district
judges do not wish to limit the essential tasks magistrates perform daily on the basis of
some theoretical threat to the structure of the federal government).
The Supreme Court rejected the historical necessity/efficiency argument in Chadha,
462 U.S. at 958. The Court invalidated a legislative veto provision in an act of Congress,
on the grounds that Congress' reservation of a veto power to itself constituted a
usurpation of the Executive's authority, violating the separation of powers principle. Id.
at 959. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, dismissed the government's
contention that the administrative benefits of the legislative veto mechanism far out-
weighed the harm to constitutional values, pointing out that "it is crystal clear from the
records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers
ranked other virtues higher than efficiency." Id. at 958-59. The Court's decision invalidated
similar legislative veto provisions in scores of other existing laws. Id. at 967 (White, J.,
dissenting). The import of Chadha is clear; the Court can be particularly inflexible when
dealing with matters that implicate the separation of powers.
174. See supra note 108 (describing different conclusions reached by the Third, First,
and Ninth Circuits on the same issue).
175. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 3401(b) (1988) (conferring upon magistrates the authority to
conduct misdemeanor trials upon receiving the written consent of the defendant). The
Act does not require litigant consent for referral of some duties, such as evidentiary
hearings and fact finding associated with pretrial motions. 28 U.S.C. S 636(c)(1) (1988)
(requiring consent of parties before. a magistrate may preside at civil trials); 28 U.S.C. S
636 (bXIXA), (B). These tasks fit completely within the traditional conception of matters
appropriate for delegation to an adjunct officer. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying
text.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 517 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that ex
post facto defense precluded by failure to object); United States v. Coleman, 707 F.2d
374, 376 (9th Cir.) (stating that Fifth Amendment due process claim waived if not raised),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 854 (1983); United States v. Surridge, 687 F.2d 250, 255 (8th Cir.
1981) (noting that Fourth Amendment objection waived if not seasonably raised), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982).
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The parties' incentive to have a magistrate hear their case is
great because of the magistrate's unquestioned qualifications 77
and his ability to hear their case much more promptly than an
Article III judge.78
In response to these considerations, opponents of the Act
contend that the consent of the parties is irrelevant to the serious
constitutional defects in the delegation of judicial power to mag-
istrates in light of Article III's structural role in the federal
government. Parties simply are not capable of waiving compliance
with the requirements of Article III. The provisions of Article
III are tangential to the parties themselves, and go toward
establishing the character of the court and the nature of the
judicial branch. 79 Moreover, beyond the separation of powers
concerns, commentators have seriously questioned whether the
consent requirement truly safeguards a party, particularly a
criminal defendant. 80
The consent argument is appealing; if the parties could consent
to have an arbitrator or even a neighbor hear and resolve their
dispute, they certainly should have the ability to consent to
having a federal magistrate hear their case. This analysis, how-
ever, is flawed. Parties who agree to have a third party resolve
their dispute voluntarily forego their right to a federal forum. If
any judgment issued by one of these alternative fora is to have
legal effect, it must arise out of a contract between the parties
and not as an exercise of the judicial power of the United States.
When parties choose to invoke the judicial power of the United
177. See supra notes 41, 166 and accompanying text (discussing statutory qualifications
of magistrates).
178. This interest in prompt adjudication is particularly pertinent in areas in which
drug or RICO cases have swamped the federal docket. For example, in the District of
New Jersey, civil litigants may face a delay of up to five years before receiving a trial
date. See SERON, supra note 156, at 85. Another real consideration is the possibility of
having a matter decided by a judge with special competence in a particular field, such
as prisoner habeas corpus petitions or social security appeals. See id. at 91. In some
jurisdictions, district judges have encouraged magistrates to develop specialties or areas
of particular expertise, such as toxic tort and asbestos litigation. See Linda S. Mullenix,
Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 475, 538-40 (1991).
179. See supra notes 50-54.
180. See, e.g., SERON, supra note 156, at 61-62 (observing that consent may be illusory,
because "when a judge raises the question of consent to a magistrate-for whatever
reason-lawyers feel that they have little choice but to go along with the suggestion");
see also infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text (discussing institutional pressures and
problems associated with coerced consent).
1991]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:253
States, Article III prescribes that a judge protected by guaran-
tees of tenure and salary preside.181
The most persuasive argument against the hypothesis that a
party may effectively consent to the participation of the magis-
trate focuses on the nature of Article III. As discussed earlier,
the provisions of Article III do not create rights that are personal
to the parties. Rather, Article III is structural and addresses the
relationship between the three branches of government, so that
the consent of the parties is wholly irrelevant to the matter.182
An apposite analogy appears in the role that subject matter
jurisdiction plays in modern courts. Any party may object at any
time, even on appeal, if the court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion.18 Furthermore, in contrast to personal jurisdiction, parties
cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court simply by
appearing in the forum.'8 Just as parties cannot confer subject
matter jurisdiction on a court by consent, they cannot empower
a magistrate to perform tasks beyond his authority.
The issue of "coerced consent" or "forced consent" is particu-
larly problematic as it relates to voir dire and felony trials.
Experience has shown that reference of matters to magistrates
quickly becomes routine, jeopardizing Article III values. 8 5 Al-
though the Act explicitly forbids coercion,' 86 judges will likely be
181. Congress has the power to alter a court's jurisdiction, but once Congress has
chosen to create a federal forum, Article III dictates the characteristics of the officers
of that court. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. III, S 1.
182. Consent may be relevant to satisfy due process concerns that are extraneous to
the Article III analysis. The due process analysis focuses on the defendant's personal
right to a judge at voir dire. First, available precedent supports the proposition that an
individual may waive individual constitutional rights. See supra note 176. Second, the use
of a magistrate at voir dire, even if error, does not constitute a denial of due process
under current due process analysis. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Applying
the three-part test set out in Mathews, the court must consider the gravity of the private
interest the official action will affect, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this interest,
the cost to the government of providing additional process, and the increase in accuracy
or fairness arising out of the change. Id. at 335. Under this analysis, empanelment of
juries by magistrates involves no denial of due process, because the cost to the govern-
ment in having judges preside at every voir dire outweighs the potential for prejudice
to the defendant.
183. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3).
184. See Velez v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 471, 472 (1st Cir. 1979) (noting that
parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court).
185. See Kraakman, supra note 159, at 1051 (footnote omitted) ("Even without judicial
coercion, however, routinization and expansion of consensual reference must eventually
come to violate Article III constraints.").
186. The original terms of the Act included provisions insulating parties from pressures
to consent to referral:
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aware of parties who object to the referral.1' Moreover, if consent
is the norm, institutional pressures may effectively remove a
party's choice in the matter. A defendant might reasonably hes-
itate to refuse a judge's referral of voir dire to the magistrate
if doing so could alienate the federal district judge who would
otherwise hear his case.188
Courts supporting the participation of magistrates in felony
voir dire differ as to whether a defendant must affirmatively
state his consent or if mere silence constitutes a waiver of the
defendant's right to object.8 9 Gomez v. United States90 concluded
with the cryptic phrase that a defendant is entitled "to have all
critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with
(2) . .. [Tihe clerk of court shall, at the time the action is filed, notify the
parties of their right to consent to the exercise of such jurisdiction [by the
magistrate]. The decision of the parties shall be communicated to the clerk
of court. Thereafter, neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall
attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil
matter to a magistrate. Rules of court for the reference of civil matters to
magistrates shall include procedures to protect the voluntariness of the
parties' consent.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1988).
A 1990 amendment to the Federal Magistrates Act strengthens the consent provisions
for civil trials: "[Elither the district court judge or the magistrate may again advise the
parties of the availability of the magistrate, but in so doing, shall also advise the parties
that they are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences." Pub.
L. No. 101-650 § 308(a)(2), 104 Stat. 5089, 5117 (1990).
The amendment's design is to encourage referral of civil cases to magistrates, yet
"provide a proper balance between increased judicial flexibility and continued protection
of litigants from possible undue coercion." S. 2648, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
136 CONG. REC. S17,580 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
187. See Kraakman, supra note 159, at 1051 n.150 (pointing out that the blind consent
provisions of the Act may be ineffective, because judges are involved in the determination
of which cases are selected for referral and therefore would know which defendants had
refused referral).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1034 (1988). In all fairness, this concern is rather speculative. Evidence of judges
exacting some sort of retribution from parties who object to referral is nonexistent.
Understandably, a judge who has referred a matter to a magistrate because he did not
want to handle it might bear some ill will against the party who made the judge handle
the matter. Discussions with federal magistrates in the Eastern District of Virginia,
however, indicate that objection to referral is not a source of friction between parties
and judges, but simply a procedural matter. Interviews with The Honorable Tommy E.
Miller and The Honorable William Prince, United States Magistrate Judges, in Norfolk,
Va. (Nov. 8, 1990) [hereinafter Interviews].
189. Compare Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 311 (3d Cir.
1989) (finding that silence constitutes a valid waiver), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211 (1990)
with United States v. Martinez-Torres, 912 F.2d 1552, 1555 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(holding that litigant must affirmatively state consent).
190. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
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jurisdiction to preside."'19 Gomez clearly expressed the Court's
real doubts as to whether defendants are freely giving their
consent and whether that consent can empower a magistrate to
perform inherently judicial functions.'9 The Court in Peretz ig-
nored the concerns surrounding coerced consent, emphasizing
that a defendant's consent is the key to a magistrate's authority
to preside, regardless of whether that consent is affirmatively
stated or implied through silence. 93
De Novo Review
The Federal Magistrates Act provides for review by an Article
III judge of all findings and actions by a magistrate.1 94 The review
provisions of the Act in many instances constitute a sufficient
safeguard to protect the rights of parties and guarantee that
magistrate conduct does not violate Article III. 95 For example,
if a magistrate hears evidence or testimony and makes a prelim-
inary report and recommendation as to its admissibility, the
availability of a district judge to review these findings adequately
preserves the litigant's rights.196
In the previous example, the nature of the proceeding allows
for effective review. The Gomez decision, however, clearly stated
that voir dire was not open to effective review, given the special
nature of the proceeding.197 The Gomez holding suggests that
191. Id. at 876.
192. The argument for consent is admittedly stronger in regard to civil trials, in which
litigants willingly appear in the forum. Strong practical reasons mandate a higher
threshold of protection in criminal cases than in civil cases: the defendant's liberty is at
stake, the stigma of criminal conviction far outweighs thd possible embarrassment and
disappointment of losing a civil suit, and the defendant is not willingly brought before
the court. Although these factors mandate a heightened concern for protection in criminal
actions, they do not necessarily compel a low standard for civil actions. Moreover, they
do not go to the fundamental question of whether Article III affords magistrates juris-
diction over the matter.
193. Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2669 (1991).
194. 28 U.S.C. 5 636(b)(1), (c}(3)-(5) (1988).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682-84 (1980) (finding that referral
of an evidentiary hearing to a magistrate did not violate Article III because the district
judge was available to review the magistrate's decisions).
196. A district judge need not always review the findings of the magistrate; review is
only necessary in the event of an objection. 28 U.S.C. S 636(bXl). The adversarial system
therefore assures that judges are put on notice when questionable circumstances arise.
Moreover, the review requirement does not mandate that the judge rehear the evidence
or testimony, even if the party has raised an objection. Rather, the judge need review
only the record and the magistrate's report. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676.
197. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874-75 (1989); see also supra note 99 and
accompanying text.
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appellate review must be real and not illusory in order to satisfy
the requirements of Article III. Voir dire does not provide an
opportunity for the kind of heightened appellate review required
for proceedings conducted by a non-Article III officer. 19 8 Errors
may occur at the voir dire stage that can have a substantially
prejudicial effect upon the trial without providing a defendant
any grounds for showing harm or prejudice upon appeal.199 A
single biased juror can fatally affect the outcome of the proceed-
ings,20 but the truly damaging effect occurs in the jury deliber-'
ation room, beyond the reach of court reporters, attorneys, and
judges. Counsel and judges can prevent this result only at voir
dire.20' Despite the doubts expressed by the Court in Gomez
regarding the efficacy of appellate review of voir dire, the ma-
jority in Peretz simply found that review by the judge of the
transcript was no worse than review of other functions, such as
an evidentiary hearing.202
The appellate review argument also contains a flaw in that it
provides no limiting principle. In theory at least, anyone could
conduct original proceedings, so long as review by an Article III
judge is available.20 3 The idea that Article III only provides
parties a judge possessing guarantees of tenure and salary at
the appellate level fundamentally misinterprets Article 111.204
Article III establishes the character of the federal courts and
dictates that guarantees of tenure and salary protect the inde-
198. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 874.
199. See, e.g., id. at 874 n.27. The Gomez decision also noted that having a judge involve
himself at a later point in voir dire could be problematic. "Although a judge similarly
could question jurors further, as a practical matter a second interrogation might place
jurors on the defensive, engendering prejudices irrelevant to the facts adduced at trial."
Id. at 875 n.29.
200. See United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1438 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("The trial
lawyer knows that who decides the truth from the evidence may be as important as the
evidence."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1034 (1988).
201. Id. (referring to voir dire as "an integral component of trial").
202. Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2671 (1991).
203. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 n.39
(1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that the requirements of Article III are not limited to
the appellate stage).
204. The Court rejected this argument in Northern Pipeline.
Appellants suggest that Crowell and Raddatz stand for the proposition that
Art. I is satisfied so long as some degree of appellate review is provided.
But that suggestion is directly contrary to the text of.our Constitution . ...
Our precedents make it clear that the constitutional requirements for the
exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication, and
not only on appeal . . ..
Id. at 86 n.39.
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pendence of those who exercise the judicial power of the United
States.
Internal Delegation
Proponents of expanded magistrate authority stress that Ar-
ticle III judges exert absolute control over magistrates. The
Federal Magistrates Act provides that Article III judges may
appoint and remove magistrates, and any task a magistrate
performs originates from the Article III judge.2 5 Given such
substantial controls, proponents contend that magistrates pose
no threat to core Article III values. Moreover, the legislative
history to the Act provides that the magistrates' jurisdiction
derives from the Article III courts that appointed them.20 6 Despite
these provisions, however, the system of internal delegation does
not necessarily resolve the heart of the Article III concern: the
preservation of judicial independence.2 07
The Framers incorporated guarantees of tenure and salary into
Article III to ensure that judges would not be subject to improper
influences, from either inside or outside the judicial branch.2 08
Seen in this light, the absolute control that Article III judges
wield over magistrates creates real concern that Article III
judges could pressure magistrates, either overtly or subtly, into
conforming with particular ideas or principles.2 19
205. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 69.
207. See Kraakman, supra note 159, at 1037-40 (suggesting that appropriate transfer of
jurisdiction to an Article I court constitutes less of a threat to judicial independence
than delegation of jurisdiction within Article III for three reasons: first, with statutory
transfer the law itself serves to limit the authority of the officer; second, transfer allows
Congress and not the judiciary to determine the officer's jurisdiction; and finally, limited
transfer of jurisdiction leaves the judiciary intact, although delegation threatens routine
adjudication by non-Article III officers).
208. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 397-402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed. 1987)
(discussing the essential role an independent judiciary must play in the federal system).
209. See Kraakman, supra note 159, at 1056.
This ongoing, informal oversight creates the risk of impermissible intrusion
on the magistrate's substantive decisions. The danger is not that magistrates
will come to function as judicial alter egos, but rather that they may be
encouraged to adopt a risk-averse strategy of adjudication by the pressure
of judicial scrutiny, a strategy eschewing unconventional decisions that might
otherwise be prompted by novel legal claims or by pressing factual idiosyn-
cracies. Such "judicious" decisionmaking would be inconsistent with the
premise that the magistrate is capable of serving as the functional equivalent
of the judge.
Id. at 1056-57 (footnotes omitted).
This concern is admittedly conjectural. Federal magistrates in the Eastern District of
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A second aspect of the internal delegation rationale for allowing
magistrates to exercise extensive adjudicative authority centers
on the Appointments Clause in the Constitution.210 Because the
Constitution allows Congress to delegate the appointment of
"inferior Officers" to either the executive or the judiciary,21' this
theory appears to offer some support for the office of magistrate.
Federal magistrates are Article I officers, created by authority
of congressional legislation. Congress has delegated the authority
to appoint magistrates to the judiciary.2 2 The Constitution's
provisions for the delegation of appointment power to the exec-
utive or the judiciary, however, are still subject to the constraints
of Article III. Congressional ability to simply create non-Article
III officers who exercise the judicial power of the United States
would render Article III an empty vessel, potentially irrelevant
in the system of checks and balances.
The argument that internal delegation of authority to magis-
trates alleviates Article III concerns presumes that the Consti-
tution guarantees an independent judge but not necessarily one
with salary and tenure protection. Under that analysis, nothing
would prevent Congress from authorizing the delegation of de-
cisionmaking authority to law clerks or court reporters, so long
as they satisfy the appearance of independence. Although such
a scenario might seem unlikely, widespread adjudication by non-
Article III judges is a present reality.
Many of the functions magistrates perform satisfy the essential
attributes test 213 and constitute no threat to Article III values.
For example, when a magistrate hears a nondispositive motion
argument or prepares a report and recommendation for a district
judge, final decisionmaking authority remains at all times with
the district judge, thereby not compromising Article III. When
a magistrate hears matters and renders final decisions not subject
to meaningful review, 214 however, he acts in a manner beyond
the traditional boundaries of the adjunct officer doctrine.
Virginia suggested that the possibility of a district judge attempting to influence a federal
magistrate is so unlikely as not to merit comment. Interviews, supra note 188. Never-
theless, the threat of subtle or even unintentional coercion remains. In separation of
powers issues, the Supreme Court has indicated that any threat will be subject to
stringent review. See supra notes 171-72.
210. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
211. Id.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988) (providing for the appointment of magistrates).
213. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
214. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874 (1989) (expressing skepticism that a
judge could effectively review voir dire proceedings).
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The Supreme Court has stated explicitly that voir dire is a
critical stage of the trial process, 215 for mistakes in voir dire can
infect the entire trial. The reservations the Court expressed in
Gomez regarding the efficacy of appellate review of the proceed-
ing by an Article III judge are persuasive. A transcribed record
cannot adequately capture the essence of the voir dire, when the
decisionmaker must consider the demeanor of the potential juror
as well as his spoken answers.216 Because of this failure in the
review mechanism,21 7 and the critical nature of voir dire in the
trial, empanelment of juries by magistrates violates the essential
attributes test. In essence, final decisionmaking authority rests
not with an Article III judge but with the magistrate, which,
under traditional Article III analysis, violates the Constitution.
This analysis applies with equal force to the practice of allowing
magistrates to conduct civil jury and nonjury trials and possibly
misdemeanor trials as well. 218 Faithful application of the adjunct
officer rationale, therefore, should not provide a basis for imbuing
magistrates with jurisdiction over the proceedings at issue here.219
In Peretz, the Court has resolved the issue of voir dire by
adopting a very loose reading of its own precedents in that area.
The decision in Peretz, however, offers no guidance to lower
courts in determining what other responsibilities magistrates may
assume. The Court's traditional analysis of Article III issues,
discussed above, will continue to hamper the development of the
federal magistracy as a key component of the federal judicial
system. An alternative Article III analysis is required to aid both
Congress and the courts in revising and interpreting the Federal
Magistrates Act.
An Alternative to Traditional Article III Analysis
The observation that the Federal Magistrates Act does not
comport with both the Court's historical approach to Article III
215. Id. at 873.
216. Id. at 874-75
217. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text (discussing the role of appellate
review in determining whether delegations of authority to magistrates violate Article
III).
218. Statutes expressly provide for the participation of magistrates in misdemeanor
trials. 18 U.S.C. S 3401(a) (1988).
219. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1046 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that the inquiry is not so much on the characteristics of
the office of magistrate, but on what the magistrates do). Judge Posner suggests we
should not look to mitigating factors such as consent, review, or delegation, but focus
instead on the tasks performed by magistrates. If the tasks are an exercise of the judicial
power of the United States, a judge with guarantees of tenure and salary must perform
them. Id. at 1046-48, 1053-54.
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analysis and the separation of powers does not necessarily end
the inquiry. Because of the unique position occupied by magis-
trates in the federal judicial system, the Court's traditional
approaches are inapposite.
The Court developed the legislative court doctrine and the
adjunct officer doctrine to curb unwarranted legislative or ex-
ecutive intrusion into the province of the judiciary.220 The doc-
trines developed, however, in response to very different concerns
than magistrates present. For example, the adjunct officer doc-
trine arose in response to well-grounded fears that United States
commissioners and bureaucrats from administrative agencies were
incompetent to exercise wide-ranging judicial authority. 221 The
legislative court doctrine arose to place real limits on Congress'
authority to create alternative tribunals with the power to ad-
judicate matters without any oversight from Article III courts.222
The concerns that drove the Court's strict and limiting ap-
proach to Article III analysis simply do not apply to federal
magistrates. First, magistrates are under the direct and constant
supervision of Article III judges, and few doubts exist regarding
their competence. Second, given the appointment system,223 out-
side influences are unlikely to weigh heavily in the selection
process. Third, the Act is clearly not an attempt by Congress to
weaken constitutional courts. 224 Finally, the services rendered by
magistrates have become essential to the proper functioning of
the federal judicial system. In light of these considerations, the
Court's traditional methods of analysis are ill-suited and unrea-
sonably restrictive when applied to federal magistrates. A new
220. See supra notes 60-66, 153-58 and accompanying text (discussing the origin and
application of the legislative court doctrine).
221. See supra notes 22 and 71 and accompanying text (discussing the defects in the
United States commissioners and analyzing the genesis of the essential attributes test in
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
222. See supra notes 60-66, 153-58 and accompanying text.
223. Magistrates are appointed by the judges of the district in which they serve. 28
U.S.C. S 631(a) (1988). The provisions of Article III that ensure judicial independence also
protect the appointment process from undue outside influence. If guarantees of tenure
and salary can insulate judges from outside pressures in deciding cases, those same
guarantees can also ensure the integrity of the selection and appointment of federal
magistrates. Moreover, the judge serves his own best interests by appointing competent
individuals as magistrates, because the judge will be relying heavily on the ability and
integrity of the magistrate.
224. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (per
curiam) (observing that Article I operates to prevent "'the encroachment or aggran-
dizement of one branch at the expense of another' ") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 22 (1976)).
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approach to Article III will render courts more flexibile and thus
better able to respond to new stimuli without having to distort
the traditional tests beyond recognition. The following analysis
is by no means an "open door" for an active magistracy, but
rather a mechanism through which the federal court system can
preserve the integrity of Article III courts and still function
effectively in a rapidly changing environment.22 5
The alternative Article III analysis involves balancing the
interests of litigants and the judicial system in rapid and effective
adjudication against the threat to the integrity of Article III
courts. The critical factors to consider in the analysis are the
complexity of the delegated task, the opportunity for effective
appellate review of the matter by an Article Ill judge, the
possibility of obtaining the unforced consent of the parties, and
the likelihood that such delegation will deprive the court of
matters historically reserved strictly to Article III officers. 26 The
balancing approach applies to any task that a judge wishes to
delegate to a magistrate. Although its terms are necessarily
vague-in order to deal with unanticipated circumstances-the
test provides more guidance than the "additional duties" language
of the statute227 and more flexibility than the Court's traditional
Article III approaches.
Some examples may help to clarify how to apply the test. In
the case of voir dire, traditional analysis provides little guidance
for lower courts in determining the limits of a magistrate's
jurisdiction. 28 Under the balancing approach, the judicial system
225. This new approach does not require the abandonment of either the legislative
court doctrine or the adjunct officer doctrine. Rather, the new analysis applies only to
magistrates and addresses their particular strengths.
226. As discussed above, the balancing approach does not constitute an open door for
magistrate jurisdiction. See supra note 225. A variety of tasks still remain inherently
judicial, and referral of those tasks to magistrates could damage the integrity of Article
III and lessen public faith in the federal judicial system. For example, the argument that
referral of voir dire could lead to widespread loss of confidence in the federal judicial
system may be dismissed as overreaching. To the layman, voir dire is a relatively obscure
proceeding, and even courts debate whether it is a central part of the trial. Compare
United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1438 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (stating that voir dire
is "an integral component") with United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 874 (1st Cir.
1983) (endorsing referral of voir dire to magistrates because it "sav[es] valuable time for
our busy district court judges"). In another context-a felony trial, for example-
adjudication by a non-Article III officer could indeed result in a crisis in public confidence
in Article III courts. In a felony trial, in which a citizen's liberty hangs in the balance,
the public expects judges of unquestionable impartiality.
227. 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(3) (1988).
228. The wildly divergent responses the courts of appeals have given to the same issue
indicate the inadequacy of the Court's traditional tests. See supra note 108 and accom-
panying text.
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has a substantial interest in having time-consuming jury empan-
elment proceedings conducted by a magistrate, and the threat to
core Article III values is not overwhelming. Voir dire is not a
terribly complicated procedure and should be well within the
competence of a magistrate. Furthermore, though the potential
for effective appellate review is rather limited, affirmative con-
sent requirements will leave litigants the option of demanding
an Article III judge.22 Under the balancing analysis, therefore,
felony voir dire clearly falls within a magistrate's authority.
Concern for the integrity of Article III courts provides a
limiting principle in determining the extent of the magistrates'
jurisdiction, because allowing non-Article III officers to conduct
certain proceedings could substantially undercut the prestige and
authority of the judicial branch. For example, judges in some
districts may wish to assign felony trials to federal magistrates.20
Balancing the factors discussed above, however, renders such a
delegation of authority violative of Article III. Referral to mag-
istrates jeopardizes the rights of defendants, in spite of the
interest of the judicial system in clearing criminal cases from the
docket. The likelihood of obtaining the uncoerced consent of the
felony defendant presents another problem. In light of the huge
number of criminal cases on the federal docket, referral could
become so routine as to become a mere formality; institutional
pressures could prove irresistible.2 1 Finally, a felony trial can be
an extremely complicated matter. Although the appropriate stan-
dard of appellate review for proceedings conducted by a district
judge is clear, a question remains whether appellate courts should
grant the same deference to magistrates. 32
229. The appellate review and consent requirements place some implicit responsibilities
on counsel for the parties. Attorneys who desire an Article III judge should demand one;
if a proceeding has only limited potential for appellate review, attorneys must remain
especially vigilant during the proceeding and vigorously pursue any objection both with
the magistrate and with the judge.
230. This alternative is not so unlikely as it may sound. Given the flood of criminal
cases (mainly drug cases) and the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. S 3161 (1988)), many
federal district judges handle criminal cases almost exclusively. See SERON, supra note
156, at 44 (discussing the effect of criminal cases on the courts' ability to hear civil cases).
231. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. Concerns regarding the routine
referral of matters to magistrates are particularly vivid in the criminal context, given
the extreme time pressures the Speedy Trial Act has placed on the federal court system.
See supra note 230.
232. Appellate courts review the rulings of Article III judges on a "de novo" basis for
questions of law and a "clearly erroneous" standard for questions of fact. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 52(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The clearly erroneous standard affords trial judges
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The balancing approach is tailored to the particular character-
istics of the federal magistracy and is not readily applicable to
other non-Article III officers or tribunals. It provides a flexible
analytical tool to determine whether referral of a variety of tasks
satisfies the requirements of Article III. The federal judicial
system is in dire need of the services of the magistratess and
a new approach to Article III may allow courts to utilize mag-
istrates to their full potential without jepardizing core Article
III values.
CONCLUSION
Faithful application of the Supreme Court's traditional Article
III tests results in a finding that many of the recent delegations
of authority to magistrates under the Federal Magistrates Act
violate separation of powers principles. The legislative court
doctrine and the adjunct officer doctrine provide little basis for
magistrates performing inherently judicial tasks. The traditional
analyses are particularly inadequate when applied to the magis-
tracy. Two decades of experience with the magistrates, and a
rapidly evolving legal environment, require a more flexible ap-
proach. A new test, balancing judicial efficiency against the rights
of parties, will allow courts to delegate a wider variety of tasks
to magistrates, while still retaining control over the entire proc-
ess. The result will be a more effective and equitable adminis-
tration of justice in the federal judicial system.
Brendan Linehan Shannon
considerable latitude for exercising discretion in the conduct of the trial, and magistrates
should not necessarily possess the same latitude. On the other hand, allowing a defendant
who chooses to have a magistrate conduct his trial to benefit from heightened scrutiny
on appeal is manifestly unfair.
233. A conservative approach would seem to require that magistrates remain active
only in very narrowly defined areas, and that the President should appoint more federal
judges to satisfy the needs of the federal judicial system. This is only a partial solution.
Magistrates, even when exercising expanded powers, occupy a radically different position
than a federal district judge. The magistrate is a lower tier of judicial officer who answers
directly to the federal judge. The same provisions of Article III that ensure the inde-
pendence of Article III judges also preclude a superior/subordinate relationship between
federal judges.
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